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INTRODUCTION

Herbert Hovenkamp has had a tremendous impact in antitrust
scholarship. With over 4000 citations in the WestlawJLR database (most of
which are for his antitrust scholarship), Hovenkamp is one of the most cited
scholars in legal academia and has been recognized by the legal academy and
the bar for his contribution to antitrust.' Hovenkamp's total citations are in
part a function of his academic outputs; with 12 books (including
monographs, edited books, and case books), plus the two-volume treatise on
IP and Antitrust and the 2 i-volume Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application ("Treatise"),2 Hovenkamp could fill multiple
shelves of most libraries. He has also published over 200 book chapters,
articles, and book reviews.
Hovenkamp's scholarship has not only shaped academic discourse but
also that of the courts.3 Justice Breyer once remarked that litigants "would
prefer to have two paragraphs of [the Areeda-Hovenkamp] treatise on their
side than three Courts of Appeals or four Supreme Court Justices."4 One
review of Hovenkamp's work explains, "Hovenkamp speaks with oracle-like
authority on antitrust matters."5
This Essay examines Hovenkamp's influence on antitrust law and policy
in the courts. Part II explains the role of the Treatise and Hovenkamp's
academic writing in antitrust law and policy. This Part focuses primarily upon
the Treatise within the merger law context-procedurally wiih issues of
antitrust injury, and substantively with the case law regarding merger
efficiencies. Additionally, this Essay provides a case count citation analysis of
Hovenkamp's scholarship which indicates that Hovenkamp is cited more
heavily than other prominent treatise writers or scholars in the field of
antitrust law.
After Part III provides some initial meta-level explanations regarding
Hovenkamp's "market power" in federal court opinions, this Essay undertakes
a textual analysis of court citations to the Treatise and scholarship within the
context of merger law both procedurally and substantively and, more
specifically, antitrust injury (in Part IV) and the efficiencies "defense" (in
1.

Bill Baer, Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp,

1oo

IOWA L. REV.

BULL. 1, 1-2 (2014).

2.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-TurnerTreatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 815, 816 (1996) (providing a history of Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principlesand

Their Application from its inception in 1978 through 1996). The Treatise was originally authored
by Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner. Id. Hovenkamp's work on this enterprise began in
1984 and is ongoing. Id. Numerous scholars have contributed to the Treatise over the years
including: Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, Einer Elhague, and John L. Solow. See id.
Its current volumes span the work's third or fourth edition.
3.

See generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in the

Lower Courtsand What It Meansfor InstitutionalReform in Antitrus 1oo IOWA L. REV. 1919 (2015).
4. Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam:PhillipE. Areeda, 1o9 HARv. L. REV. 889, 89o (1996).
5. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2007).
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Parts V-VI). Notwithstanding the extraordinary citation count associated with
the Treatise, to the extent that his ideas have become institutionalized, such
numbers may even understate its influence. 6 This is because citations to cases
that embody its ideas do not necessarily cite to the Treatise. Part VII concludes
that Hovenkamp has played an important role in the development of antitrust
law.
II.

ANTITRUST'S STRUCTURAL SHIFT AND THE ROLE OF THE TREATISE

The shape of antitrust's economics revolution in policy circles rests
largely upon decided cases. At the macro level, in isolation, ideas do not shape
case law. The institutional structure of the U.S. antitrust system is a function
of the moment in time in which it was set up (its initial endowment) and its
institutional development based upon case law and relevant policy
developments.7 Though there is some path dependence to the initial
endowment, over time the path dependence can be shifted to incorporate
new developments in areas such asjudicial interpretation, economic thinking,
and broader macro-level government policies and priorities. 8
During the 197os, antitrust began its revolution to a more economicsbased approach.§ Both procedurally and substantively, the antitrust doctrines
of today bear little resemblance to those of a couple of generations ago.-0 As
Bohannan and Hovenkamp explain:
6.
7.

See infra text accompanying notes 92-93 (defining the concept of institutionalization).
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standardsin U.S. and E. U Antitrust Enforcement,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2506-09 (2013) [hereinafter Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards]. On
issues of how antitrust and its institutions matter to policy, see, for example, Roger D. Blair &
Christine Durrance, Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action and Antitrust Policy, 1oo IOWA
L. REV. 1943 (2015); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-EnhancingMerger Efficiencies, loo
IOWA L. REV. 1969 (2015); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel
Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, 1oo IOWA L. REV. 1997 (2015); Daniel Crane, AllI
Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in 1912, 1oo IOWA L. REV. 2025 (2015); Keith N.
Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, 1o IOWA L. REV. 2069 (2015);
William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent Agency:
Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, oo IOWA L. REV. 2085 (2015); Mark A. Lemley &
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, ioo IOWA L. REV. 2115 (2015);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Commerce Requirement in TyingLaw, 1oo IOWA L. REV. 2135 (2015); Alan
J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Professor
Hovenkamp, 1oo IOWA L. REV. 2161 (2015); Barak Orbach, The Durabilityof Formalism in Antitrust,
1oo IOWA L. REV. 2197 (2015); and Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, PromotingInnovation,
1o IOWAL. REV. 2223 (2015).
8.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 11-30
(Harvard Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE]; HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAw: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970, at
210-39 (2015) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW].

9.

See generally Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J.

COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733 (201 1) (providing empirical support for the shift to economic

analysis).
1o. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835 (2014); Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration:
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The story of antitrust reform is well known. The half-century
period that ended in the late 197os had seen many antitrust
infidelities, mainly from expansion that today seems unprincipled,
given that injury to competition was so often absent.
Today, the antitrust landscape differs so much from the view of
Brown Shoe that one could barely recognize it from that vantage
point.["] The reformation of antitrust involved not only the
development of a coherent theory of harm related to the underlying
goals of the antitrust laws, but also a major revision in substance.2
With regard to both procedural and substantive goals, the shift in antitrust
has been to incorporate workable legal rules based on the latest economic
thinking.'3 Hovenkamp's role in this transformation has been considerable.
The institutional structure within which this revolution occurred
constrained antitrust to incremental movements from the mid-1 9 70s to the
present with a series of cases slowly reversing doctrine that arguably did not
make economic sense.'4 Antitrust's overall approach since the late 1970s is
one largely guided by economic analysis based on a "consumer welfare"
standard that analyzes competitive effects.,5 The Treatise has aided in this
shift by subtly changing its policy prescriptions in each edition.' 6
Leverage, Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983 (2014); D. Daniel Sokol, The
Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 1003 (2014).
11.
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 49-52 (2000) (providing context for Brown Shoe and the

cases of this era).
12.
Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51
B.C. L. REV. 905, 9o8-12 (2010) (footnote omitted).

13. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in
Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago
and Transaction Cost Economics]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81
FORDHM L. REV. 2471 (2013) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, ImplementingAntitrust's Welfare Goals].
14.

See generally HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 8 (providing several

examples throughout the text).
15. Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, supra note 13, at 2477 (explaining
the welfare goals under antitrust law).
16. The Treatise has developed to reflect economic theory and administrability concerns.
Hovenkamp confirms that his writing in the Treatise is more conservative than his academic
writing for exactly this reason. As Hovenkamp explains, "A good treatise must wed the case law,
the relevant statutes, and the underlying theory into a coherent scheme that deserves to be called
policy." Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 842. One example in which Hovenkamp demonstrates
Harvard concerns of administrability and a coherent economics based scheme is in the area of
predatory pricing. Though more sophisticated economic models of predation exist that would
expand the liability for such conduct, courts continue to use the Areeda-Turner test for
predatory pricing primarily for two reasons: "First, it tends to keep predatory pricing cases out of
court and away from juries, two properties that make it attractive to judges. Second, and more
importantly, no one has been able to come up with something better." HerbertJ. Hovenkamp,
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As a coauthor of the leading antitrust treatise since 1984 and its primary
author since 1992-1993, Hovenkamp has had the power to shape antitrust

case development. Yet, how to use that power leads to difficult issues generally,
an issue with which Hovenkamp has had to contend. Treatise writers in other
fields have been far more intentional in their advocacy of shaping case law by
suggesting that the law had already moved in a certain direction even when it
had not.,7 The ability to explain the law and advocate its shift is not always
executed so crisply. As one article explains:
The treatise writer's dilemma is that while reliability requires
faithful interpretation of the law as it stands, he or she must also
remain sufficiently detached and forward-looking to assist
decisionmakers in shaping the law as it ought to be. The better
treatise writers resolve this tension by devising jurisprudential and
methodological approaches that broaden the horizons of
experienced practitioners in the field.' 8
Hovenkamp also grappled with the treatise writer's dilemma. As an
Assistant Professor, he reviewed the first edition of Earl W. Kintner's treatise,
Federal Antitrust Law. Hovenkamp was not yet an author on the Treatise.
Hovenkamp' explained that Kintner's treatise was "substantially less
theoretical than its chief competitor, Antitrust Law, by Areeda and Turner....
However, someone reading their volumes cannot escape the impression that
Antitrust Law is really Professors Areeda and Turner telling what antitrust law
ought to be."'9 Hovenkamp has been very careful in his stewardship of the
Treatise to both explain the law as well as to advocate how to shift it to make
more economic sense in a way that is administrable. With multiple volumes,

The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A CriticalJournal 18 (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 15-o6, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2 4 2 2120. In 1983, Hovenkamp wrote an article suggesting a market structure screen
to make the Areeda-Turner test less prone to error. Herbert Hovenkamp & Avarelle SilverWestrick, Predatory Pricingand the Ninth Circuit, 19 8 3 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 443, 482 ("[P]redatory pricing
is a real problem only in concentrated markets that are conducive to monopolization, and even
then only when the defendant is a dominant firm."). Hovenkamp explained how a predatory
pricing rule had to be administrable and lead to few error costs. Such thinking survives in the
Treatise with regard to treatment of predatory pricing, including how predatory pricing claims
may be examined specifically in the private-merger context as a possible result of a postconsummated merger. This thinking also has become adopted by a number of courts. See, e.g.,
Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum, Corp., 79 F-3 d 182, 192-93 ( ist Cir. 1996);
Rebel Oil Co. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51 F.3 d 1421, 1440 ( 9 th Cir. 1995); United States v. AMR
Corp., 14o F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1196-97 (D. Kan. 2ool).
17. See, e.g., CraigJoyce, Keepers of the Flame:Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts (FifhEdition)
and the ProsserLegacy, 39 VAND. L. REV. 851, 855-56 (1986) (book review).
18. J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43
STAN. L. REV. 943, 943 (1991) (book review).
19.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 521, 522 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
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the Treatise has many moving pieces that must be internally consistent and
not too aggressive in its policy prescriptions lest courts ignore it.
The Treatise's analytical approach only partially explains its influenceHovenkamp's impact has been particularly great in the courts because the
courts were undergoing a revolution towards the greater use of economics to
guide case law (moving beyond structure-conduct-performance regarding
substantive antitrust issues and showing a greater concern regarding error
costs from false positives), and antitrust law takes a particularly common-law
approach relative to many other areas of law. Antitrust case law development
is primarily federal law, unlike other famous treatises such as contracts, torts,
and property; it is also not heavily code-based. Thus, the statutory regime in
antitrust is very limited and stands in contrast to many areas of administrative
law.o The common-law approach to antitrust is by design.2I Congress enacted
antitrust statutes that were purposely vague in order to allow the common law
to develop antitrust jurisprudence. As to timing, Hovenkamp became an
academic precisely as antitrust began a structural shift towards an economicsbased understanding of the field with a singular economics-based goal for law
and policy.is
Next, this Essay will illustrate Hovenkamp's general influence on the
shape of case law. Finally, the Essay will focus on his scholarship and the
Treatise in refining the law of mergers both as to procedure-with a focus on
antitrust injury in private merger litigation and substance-and as to
efficiencies.
III. HOVENKAMP'S

INFLUENCE IN ANTITRUST'S REVOLUTION

In this Part we present citation-based evidence of the great influence of
Hovenkamp on antitrust in the past half-century. As a reference, there are
also citation counts to two other leading antitrust thinkers, Robert Bork and
Richard Posner.4 All three published books and articles that advocated
important changes for the antitrust doctrine.5 This Essay also compares the

20.

See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.

1055, 1o63 (2010).
21.
See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature ofAntitrust Law, 6o TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982).
22.
Sokol, supra note 2o, at 1O63.
23.
See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Made (Too) Simple, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 919 (2014).
24. Bork's antitrust writing was the subject of two symposia in 2014 (after his death)--one
in the Antitrust Law Journal and one in the Journal of Law and Economics. Posner's antitrust
influence has been acknowledged even by some of his harshest critics. See Thomas E. Kauper,
Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK. THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON

U.S. ANTITRUST 40, 46 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2oo8).
25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1993);
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 8; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
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influence of the two important multiple volume antitrust treatises of the past
50 years: Areeda-Turner-Hovenkamp and Kintner.
We measure changes in antitrust thinking through a citation analysis of
federal antitrust cases from January 1979 to August 2014 in the Wesdaw
ALLFEDS database. This period covers Hovenkamp's teaching career and
much of the most recent generation of shifts in antitrust's revolution. From
this population of cases, we construct the citation count of the Treatise since
Hovenkamp was added as an author of the Treatise.26 We also note that
Hovenkamp has 124 citations for his non-Treatise scholarship. This includes
nine citations that cite to both the Treatise and to Hovenkamp's non-Treatise
work.
Though recognizing that citation counts are an imperfect measure, the
number of citations is generally acknowledged to be at least positively
correlated with influence.27 This also holds true of citations in the court
context.2s There are two rationales for using this measure in addition to its
ease of calculation. First, influence in terms of citations may reflect quality.
Strong work will be cited in support of a legal position because the citation
brings additional clarity to the legal analysis in a court's decision. The best
ideas will also prevail in the marketplace of ideas, and this will be reflected in
the courts. 29 There may also be branding effects of citations to a famous
scholar.so For example, the Hovenkamp brand in the form of a citation may
signal quality and reduce search costs for judges.3, The Breyer quotation on
the importance of the Treatise noted earlier is an example of the power of
the Hovenkamp brand.

26. We are cautious of counting cases merely for the sake of counting cases. Erwin
Chemerinsky, No Warrantfor Radical Change: A Response to Professors George and Guthrie, 58 DUKE
L.J. 16gi, 1701 (2009) ("Empirical research about judging can be enormously valuable if it
provides important insights into courts and judicial behavior. But empirical research can do great
harm if it is assumed that something matters just because it can be measured and if it is allowed
to substitute for careful normative analysis and arguments.").
27.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly
Impact of Law Schools, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998); Brian Leiter, Measuringthe Academic Distinction
of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 (2000).
28.
See, e.g., DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 65

Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 83-84
(1983); Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent:A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79
(2002);

AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 18o (1985); Charles A. Johnson, Citations to Authority in Supreme Court
Opinions, 7 LAW & POL'Y 5 o 9 , 509 (1985).
29.
RICHARDA. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 115-19 (1 99o).
30.

See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring

Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (suggesting that a strong brand reduces
search costs).
31.
William M. Landes et al., JudicialInfluence: A CitationAnalysis of Federal Courts of Appeals
Judges, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275-76 (1998).

2046

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 100:2039

The citation count-based impacts are somewhat limited because they only
measure the number of citations.32 They do not, for example, measure
positive versus negative citations (a negative citation would suggest lower
quality) or how important the citation is for an opinion- is the citation part
of a string cite, or is the citation used for purposes of establishing greater
authority? Other issues include the frequency with which citations are within
the opinion, whether there are extended block quotes, and how closely an
opinion tracks the substantive leanings of the writer as opposed to being a
mere restatement of the law. Lastly, the breadth and updating of the treatises
is very different. Hovenkamp's Treatise is longer than its primary
competitor.33 As a result, this more expansive coverage lends itself more easily
to citation.
A.

THE INFLUENCE OF HOVENKAMP AND OTHER PROMINENT ANTITRUST THINKERS

Hovenkamp is, by far, the most cited antitrust scholar in the courts in
recent decades. The closest comparisons in terms of citations in court
decisions are academics with significant careers as circuit court judges, for
example, Robert Bork and Richard Posner. As judges, Bork and Posner, of
course, influenced the shape of antitrust law in their opinions, which this
study does not measure.
Citations to case law may be dissimilar to citations to scholarship in part
because they are cited for authority due to their precedential value. This is
not so for a treatise or for scholarship. Ajudge's use of scholarship or a treatise
suggests a different use of authority than that of a case, even a well-reasoned
case. A well-regarded treatise has case-like authority at times in terms of a
string cite. However, a case cannot be overturned based merely on a treatise
entry as it could based on a prior holding favoring the opposite outcome. Put
differently, citations to cases constitute a different "relevant market" than
citations to scholarship.
In total, there are 473 district court decisions, 328 court of appeals
decisions and 23 Supreme Court decisions that cite to the Treatise or to
Hovenkamp's scholarship since Hovenkamp became a co-author in 1984.
These scholarship citation levels are much larger, for example, than those of
Bork and Posner. The difference in citation counts from 199o to the present

32. Laura Denvir Stith, Response, Just Because You Can Measure Something Does It Really
Count, 58 DuKE LJ. 1743, 1748 (2009) (noting a "numbers game" that emphasizes "quantity
rather than quality").
33. Kintner's treatise is nine volumes including the index and was revised in 2014. Part of
the breadth of the Treatise comes from Hovenkamp's analysis about what the law should be,
rather than just a summary of how the law stands. See infra Part III.B.
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(the last 25 years) is much starker. During that period, federal courts have
cited Bork 58 times, Posner 31 times, and Hovenkamp 781 times.34
Both Bork and Posner wrote books and articles attacking the very
foundation of substantive antitrust.s5 As such, a comparison of Hovenkamp
versus these two thinkers might not be equivalent comparisons since many of
the Hovenkamp citations go to questions of law rather than policy.
Hovenkamp also has a much richer set of writings on antitrust in terms of
scope of writing and depth on particular issues of antitrust substance and
procedure relative to Bork and Posner, neither of whom continued to
regularly write on antitrust topics since the 198os. Perhaps Hovenkamp's
topic choice and writing style in both his academic works and his Treatise also
contribute to the growing gap between Hovenkamp and the other writers in
terms of academic citations.
B.

CITATION ANALYSIS REGARDING THE ROBERTS COURT

To provide a more compatible set of comparisons, we analyze the
substantive antitrust decisions of the current Roberts-led Supreme Court.
Citations to the Treatise during the Roberts Court have gone through at least
one edition of a post-Areeda Treatise. We detail the nature of the citations to
Hovenkamp during this period.36
We note thatjudicial citations may be a function of what gets cited in the
parties' briefs before the Court. Scholars may be referenced even when the
point is not unique to their writing. Such scholarship develops its authority as
much by who says it as by who says it first. Framing an already existing idea is
itself an important contribution. The reason that courts-in our case, the
Supreme Court-cite authority may be a function of how Justices deal with
uncertainty. They may cite to established authority when there is less certainty
because the authority has its own branding effect.37

Sometimes Hovenkamp is cited more because he has written substantive
articles on the topic and the others lack Hovenkamp's breadth of writing or
34. Within the Roberts Court era, the Supreme Court cited to Bork's scholarship only three
times, none more recent than 2007, and did not cite to Posner's scholarship. See cases cited infra
Part III.C.
35.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 917 (2003)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)); William E. Kovacic, Out of Control?
Robert Bork's Portrayalof the U.S. Antitrust System in the 1970s, 79 ANTITRUST LJ. 855, 857 (2014).
36.
Every Supreme Court substantive antitrust decision in this period has cited to
Hovenkamp while citing to the scholarship of Bork and Posner much less. These statistics do not,
however, take into account citations to decisions written by Posner, the most cited non-Supreme
Courtjurist of all time. StephenJ. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr.Justice Posner? Unpackingthe Statistics,

61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 19, 28 (2oo5). Posner also has written 45 decisions involving
antitrust issues.
37. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,
217-20 (195o); PaulJ. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: InstitutionalIsomorphism
and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147, 152 (1983); David S.
Scharfstein &Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investmen 8o AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990).
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depth on certain doctrinal subtleties. However, other times Hovenkamp is
cited via the Treatise for points that are as much a restatement of where the
law is or a synthesis of the scholarly view of where the law should be rather
than a unique innovation to the doctrinal or economic analysis. For this
reason, often both sides on a particular case will use Hovenkamp and the
Treatise as the bases for their points.38 A more detailed reading of

Hovenkamp's influence on these decisions follows.
C.

How HAS THE ROBERTS COURT CTED HOVENKAMP?

The Roberts Supreme Court decided its first two antitrust decisions in
2oo6. In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., a case involving whether
a patent right presumes monopoly power and the use of a per se standard for
patent tying, the Court unanimously ruled citing Hovenkamp four times.39
The Court cited Hovenkamp on patent misuse as authority at the end of a
sentence. The second Hovenkamp citation was on the topic of how
intellectual property rights do not automatically confer monopoly power. This
second citation was in a footnote and included a quote from the Treatise and
from Hovenkamp's Antitrust-IP treatise.
That same year, the Court also decided Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., a case involving secondary line price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act, citing Hovenkamp three times.40 The first
time was to explain the origins of the Robinson-Patman Act, with the second
to describe coverage of the Act. The third citation was to quote Hovenkamp's
analysis on the Eighth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the RobinsonPatman Act.
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided three substantive antitrust cases.4'
First, in CreditSuisse Securities(USA) LLC v. Billing,a case holding that securities
law precluded antitrust law, the Court cited Hovenkamp twice.42 One involved
a quote from an article and the second a citation (along with a citation to a
court) on how financial institutions do not manipulate the market for Initial
Public Offerings for antitrust purposes. The second was a monopsony case,
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.43 There, the Court
based its claim that monopsony and monopoly were analytically similar on a
Hovenkamp article.44 Finally, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,

38. This is not unique to antitrust. A similar situation occurs in Rabbinical commentary. See
generallyJeffrey I. Roth, TheJustificationforControversy UnderJewishLaw, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 337 (1988).
39. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2oo6).
40.
See, e.g., Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 175 (2oo6).
41. The procedural antitrust case was Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
one of the most important procedural cases of all time and already cited over 25 1,000 times as

of March 16, 2015.
42.
See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282

(2007).

43.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S.

44.

Id. at 321.

312

(2007).
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Inc., the Supreme Court overturned the per se status of minimum resale price
maintenance.45 The Court cited Hovenkamp ten times, including five times
6
by the dissent, on a variety of issues.4
Subsequently, the Court quoted Hovenkamp twice in PacificBell Telephone
Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc.47 and cited or quoted Hovenkamp eight
times in American Needle, Inc. v. National FootballLeague.48 Similarly, in 2013,
the Court quoted Hovenkamp twice in Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") v.
PhoebePutney Health System, Inc.49 regarding the purpose of state action and on
market concentration and twice on the dynamics of reverse payments and
settlement, and cited him a total of 1 1 times-including twice by the dissentin FTC v. Actavis, Inc.5o
The overall picture of citations to Hovenkamp in the Roberts Court's
substantive antitrust decisions is that the citations are frequent and
meaningful. Often, the Court quotes him. When the Court cites him without
a quote, often, the citation is by itself, rather than as part of a string cite.
Moreover, Hovenkamp has been cited in every substantive antitrust decision
since 2007. When the briefs of the parties are included in the analysis,
Hovenkamp has significantly more citations to his scholarship-on both
sides-than, for example, Bork and Posner for points both large and small.
Hovenkamp seems to be a basis for which to establish authority for a factual
or analytical point by the parties for persuasive purposes to the justices. These
data offer some support to the claim made by justice Breyer, himself a former
professor of antitrust law, as to the power of the Treatise, given our earlier
qualifications of the use of citation counts.
D. HOVENKAMP CoMPARED TO OTHER ANTITRUST TREATISES
Where Hovenkamp's influence is most pronounced is vis-a-vis the other
antitrust treatises. In part, this is a function of the greater depth and breadth
of the much more substantial Treatise relative to its peers. As the leading
treatise, the Treatise also benefits from earlier precedents citing to it. There
are, however, competitors. A practitioner started the Kintner treatise as a
doctrinal treatise. One left-leaning scholar, Bauer, and two right-leaning
scholars, Lopatka and Page, took over that treatise. It is nine volumes long,
including the index. The courts have cited the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise
743 times and the Kinter treatise 125 times. The citation count of the treatises
also reflects Hovenkamp's relative influence in Supreme Court cases among

45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899, 906-o7 (2007).
See, e.g., id. at 889.
See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 455 (2009).
See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 56o U.S. 183, 190 (2010).
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v.Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1012

(2013).

50.

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v.Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223,

2227 (2013).
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the treatises. The Court has cited Hovenkamp
Kintner only once.51
TV.

23

times, while it has cited

HOVENKAMP AND PROCEDURAL ANTITRUST IN MERGERS

Perhaps the area in which the impact of Hovenkamp has been greatest
in terms of citations is in the area of antitrust injury and standing, with 162
citations in federal courts. It is not surprising, since a win on procedural
grounds of standing or injury means that a decision-maker would never get to
the substantive issue in a case. How courts made sense of the legal morass
regarding various issues in antitrust standing and injury provides a snapshot
of how one area of antitrust procedural law transformed over time to become
more internally coherent by creating various screens to promote outcomes
that were more pro-defendant but not so much as the Chicago position.52
We analyze antitrust injury in the context of private merger suits, a subset
of all of antitrust injury cases. To do so, we first explain antitrust injury and its
origins. The genesis of intellectual thought on antitrust injury stems at least
to Areeda and his 1976 article in which he suggested the need for actual harm
on competition, because there was no predation, and criticized the Third
Circuit opinion in what would eventually become Brunswick when appealed to
the Supreme Court.53 Areeda and Hovenkamp were not alone in writing on
antitrust injury matters. Chicago scholars also embraced antitrust injury.
Areeda, in his very fact-based approach, did not provide guiding principles
for making injury more coherent. In contrast, Chicago scholars pushed
efficiency54 and were suspicious of any competitor suit.55
In the case law, the Supreme Court created an antitrust injury
requirement in Brunswick. That case involved a merger challenge by a group
of bowling alley operators. They alleged that the industry-leading producer of
bowling equipment, Brunswick, had made illegal acquisitions of bowling
centers under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff bowling alley
operators alleged that their own bowling alleys would have been more
profitable had the Brunswick acquisitions gone out of business rather than
being acquired. In that case, the Supreme Court explained that antitrust
injury is "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and

o
See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 553 n.1o (199 ) (citing Kintner).
See generally William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
52.
Characterization,Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 122 1 (1989) (providing
an explanation and analysis).
53. Phillip Areeda, Comment, Antitrust Violations Without DamageRecoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1127, 1127, 1134 (1976).
54. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13, 24, 33-40 (1984);
William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U.
CHi. L. REV. 467, 471 (198o).
55. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263 (1981).

51.
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that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."5 6 The Court
found that since the defendant's behavior had been pro-competitive, the
plaintiff could not be awarded treble damages unless the defendant had
created an antitrust injury.57
The Treatise explains the rationale for antitrust injury following the
analysis of Brunswick as:
Compensation for that injury must be consistent with the purposes
of antitrust law generally and with the rationale for condemning the
particular defendant. ...At its most fundamental level, the antitrust
injury requirement precludes any recovery for losses resulting from
competition, even though such competition was actually caused by
conduct violating the antitrust laws.s
Injury means not merely that the competitors have been injured but that such
injury is a result of something other than efficiency-enhancing.59 If consumers
are better off, then there is no injury.
Hovenkamp has been concerned that, though competitors may have
more information than customers about certain business practices, they also
are just as likely to be harmed by conduct due to efficiencies rather than anticompetitive means. Consequently, the Treatise took the position, based in
part on Hovenkamp's academic writing, starting in the late 198os, 60 that
antitrust injury should screen out situations that on average were a result of
efficient behavior. The Treatise advocated in particular, "expanded summary
judgment, relatively strict proof of damages, and the array of 'standing'
doctrines that include injury-in-fact, proximity, antitrust injury, causation, and
the like." 6' These shifts in the Treatise seem to have impacted case law and
pushed it in the direction of limiting cases to those that showed that the
plaintiff suffered an economic-based antitrust injury.
Hovenkamp has helped to gradually push injury in a direction of
limiting, but not eliminating, antitrust injury suits. His initial writing in the
area was in 1984, in which he advocated the adoption of a reading of
Brunswick such that while increased efficiency will not yield antitrust injury,
6
increased post-merger market power may do SO. 2

56.
57-

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
Id.

58.
2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ROGER D. BLAIR & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OFANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 337a, at 3o6 (2d ed. 2000).

59. Whether or not the court meant antitrust injury to mean total welfare or consumer
welfare is unclear, but the difference in this case would not have impacted whether or not there
was a cognizable antitrust claim.
6o. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust'sProtected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. s (1989).
61. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 829 (footnote omitted).
62. Herbert Hovenkamp, MergerActions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 958 (1984).
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The Supreme Court extended the antitrust injury concept for private
plaintiffs regarding the merger in Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado.63 The case
involved a competitor's challenge to a merger between the second and third
largest beef packers in the country. Monfort believed that it would be harmed
if the merged firm could lower its prices, based on efficiencies, to a level below
Monfort's prices but above the merged firm's cost.
Beyond the facts of the case, Cargillisimportant because of the influence
of Areeda in the decision. Areeda was cited in the briefs of the Petitioner, the
Solicitor General, and FTC, and the Respondent-all of whom referenced the
Treatise, though the Court did not. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Cargill, explaining, "[t] o hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from
the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal
any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share. The
antitrust laws require no such perverse result."64
Cargill made the likelihood of finding of competitor standing more
difficult for private plaintiffs, borrowing the antitrust injury concept from
private plaintiff cases of section 4 of the Clayton Act. However, it did not
create a rule of per se legality as some Chicago thinkers advocated. Cargillleft
the door open to further refinement of antitrust injury in the merger context
because it ruled that there was no showing under Clayton Act section 16. This
in turn meant that the Court never reached the question whether the
proposed merger violated Clayton Act section 7.
Because the answer in Cargillwas not definitive, courts looked at specific
facts to determine injury.65 Much like the Court, Hovenkamp was unwilling to

close the door to injury on competitors. Instead, in his 1989 article he argued
that according to legislative history "competitors, at least as much as
consumers, are to be considered among antitrust's protected classes." 66 As the
selected case law description and analysis below will show, each subsequent
private antitrust injury merger case created an opportunity to address the
particular attributes of the case for or against antitrust injury. The number of
cases in which courts allowed a private suit to proceed dropped as plaintiffs
could not meet antitrust injury requirements. These requirements also were
heightened depending on the remedy sought.67
In Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. E.I Du Pont De Nemours & Co., the court
cited to Hovenkamp's article Merger Actions for Damages and the Treatise
multiple times to explain that efficiencies might cause competitors harm.68 In
Sterling Merchandising, Inc. v. Nestli, S.A., the competitor plaintiff saw its
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
(3 d Cir.

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 1o4 (1986).
Id. at116.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUSTLAw

§ 11.9, at 317 (1985).

Hovenkamp, supra note 6o, at 27.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 827-28.
See Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d
1987) (citing Hovenkamp, supra note 62, at 956); see also id. at 1245 n.8.
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competitive situation improve post-merger. 69 The plaintiff alleged that but for
the merger and subsequent activity, its competitive situation would have
improved even more.7o The court cited the Treatise for the proposition that
if there is no harm to competition, there is no antitrust injury.7' Other cases
such as Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Laboratories,Inc., a merger case involving condom
companies in which the court found no antitrust injury, cited the Treatise for
the proposition that private plaintiffs must show both an injury and a violation
of the statute.72 Similarly, in Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT& TInc., the court quoted
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., for the narrow grounds for which
antitrust injury can be found and held that the plaintiff met the injury
requirement on some claims but not others.73 Atlantic Richfield Co. in turn
cited to Hovenkamp for that proposition.74 The same pattern of citations can
be found in PacificExpress, Inc. v. UnitedAirlines, Inc.,75 where the court found
no antitrust injury because the injury was not a result of either anticompetitive
or predatory conduct, but rather of increased competition.
Subsequent cases rely upon the Treatise to explain the rationale for
antitrust injury in allowing for certain private merger challenges to survive
motions for summaryjudgment. For example, Appraisers Coalition v. Appraisals
Institute quoted the Treatise to explain the purpose of antitrust injury in the
merger setting as aiding courts because "[i] t forces the parties and the court
to reason closely about the nature of the antitrust violation alleged in order
to test whether the injury and damages claimed by the plaintiff match the
rationale for finding any violation in the first place."76 The Appraisers court
relied upon this rationale for antitrust injury (as well as the need for antitrust
law to protect consumers, not competitors, from injury) as the basis for
denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of associational standing.77

Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, S.A. 656 F. 3 d 112, t16-17 (ist Cir. 2015).
Id.at 117.
Id. at 121 ("Even if a competitor is hurt because the merger of its rivals makes them
71.
more efficient or able to compete more aggressively, that harm is not an antitrust violation, and
the competitor lacks standing." (citing 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, 1 348a, at 387)).
72. Ansell Inc. v. Schmid Labs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 467,484 (D.N.J. 1991).
73. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT & T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 3o8, 314-15, 337 (D.D.C. 201 1)
(quoting Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342-44 (199o)).
74- Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 344 ("Thus, 'proof of a per se violation and of antitrust
injury are distinct matters that must be shown independently.' . . . For this reason, we have
previously recognized that even in cases involving per se violations, the right of action under
[section] 4 of the Clayton Act is available only to those private plaintiffs who have suffered
antitrust injury." (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
334.2c, at 330 (Supp. 1989))).
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
75. Pac. Express, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to
Atlantic Richfield Co. but not including the underlying citation to the Treatise).
76. Appraisers Coal. v. Appraisal Inst., 845 F. Supp. 592, 6os (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting PHILLIP
69.
70.

E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND

THEIRAPPLICATION

77.

334.2a, at 389 (Supp. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 6o1-0o2.
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Similarly, in B.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. UnileverN.V., the court cited Hovenkamp
along with Alberta Gasto suggest a narrow application of antitrust injury.78 One
factor that allowed for a finding of antitrust injury in Bigelow as opposed to
Cargillwas a difference between the low market share in Cargillversus high
market share in Bigelow. The market share presumption can be traced back to
how the Treatise uses market share as a screen for injury.79
In another merger case of that period, Community Publishers,Inc. v. Donrey
Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held that
the Daily Record had antitrust standing.8 The standing allowed the Daily Record
to challenge the merger of two local competitors. 8,' In finding for the
plaintiffs, the court relied on the Treatise five times in its analysis on antitrust
injury.82 This included accepting the Areeda and Hovenkamp market share
screen and the need for a high threshold for reaching antitrust injury.8 3
In AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., the Seventh Circuit held that there
was no abuse of discretion by the district court in finding antitrust standing.8 4
The court relied upon the Treatise to support the notion that "[a] competitor
in the merging industry ordinarily lacks antitrust standing because that
competitor would generally only stand to gain from the increase in prices."8 5
However, the Seventh Circuit found that the factual record supported that, at
the preliminary stage of the case, the competitor had shown injury and hence
standing. 86 In addition to citing to the Treatise as authority, the court also
cited to the Supreme Court in Cargilland to an appellate court case.8 7 In this
decision, the court seems to have treated the Treatise's authority akin to that
of court decisions.
Many of the antitrust injury merger cases cite Hovenkamp and/or the
Treatise for authority. Even in cases that do not, there are citations to cases
which refer to the insights, and not just the restatement, of the Treatise. The
cases suggest that Hovenkamp has helped to shape antitrust injury case law in
the merger context.
V.

BASIC CITATION STATISTICS REGARDING ANTITRUST MERGER RULINGS

Part V examines general statistics regarding Treatise citations in select
judicial rulings involving substantive merger determinations. These meritsbased decisions include temporary restraining orders, preliminary

78.
79.
8o.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102,111 (2d Cir. 1989).
This was first articulated in Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 16, at 481-82.
Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1165-67 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 115 4 n. 9 .
Id. at1167n.16.
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F. 3 d 568, 576 ( 7 th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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injunctions, and final determinations or appeals therefrom regarding alleged
Clayton Act section 7 violations. 8 Federal court merger opinions between
198o and 2014, both published and unpublished that involve the Department
ofJustice ("DOJ") or the FTC, constitute the data for the statistical exercise.8S
Albeit a noisy signal, these statistics provide a general sense regarding the
Treatise's influence over time. It is instructive to use citations to the federal
antitrust agencies' merger guidelines as a comparison and baseline.
For our analysis, each ruling that referenced the Treatise counted as a
single citation. The sample included 88 rulings. We did not distinguish
between rulings that extensively relied on the Treatise versus those that
merely referenced it in passing. The primary statistic of interest was the
number of Treatise citations in a given time period divided by the total
number of merger rulings during that time period. We undertook a
comparable exercise with regard to the Merger Guidelines.9o This citation rate
adjusted the raw citation count to reflect time periods where there were few
merger rulings. Because the total number of merger rulings in any year is
usually small, we calculated the rates in five-year increments.

88. The single largest category of rulings that this analysis excluded entails judicial review
of Antitrust Division consent decrees under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 17o8 (1974). Other rulings excluded from our analysis include, for
example, decisions regarding state action immunity, jurisdictional or procedural matters.
89, In 1978, Volumes I through III of the Treatise were published. Volume IV, which
includes Chapter 9 (Mergers: Generally and Horizontal) and Chapter 1o (Vertical Mergers), was
first published in 198o. The Treatise was referenced only once in a merger context prior to 198o.
See Fruehauf Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 603 F.2d 345, 352 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
9 o . Although the DOJ-and subsequently DOJ and FTC-Merger Guidelines evolved over
multiple iterations, they are referred to collectively as the Merger Guidelines. See generally U.S
DEP'T OFJUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), reprinted in 4

Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,100 (Feb. 23, 2012 ) [hereinafter CURRENT MERGER GUIDELINES2010]; U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES (1992, revised 1997),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104 (Apr. 17, 1997) [hereinafter MERGER
GUIDELINES-1992]; U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984),
reprinted in4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,103 (1988) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES---1 9 84 ];
U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
13,102 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES-1 9 82]; U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,101 (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter MERGERGUIDELINES-1 9 68].
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Figure i: Trends in Case Citation Rates in Federal Antitrust Merger Cases9'
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Despite this approach's many limitations, the overall citation pattern
trends are instructive. The citation rate for the Merger Guidelines,
particularly its dramatic increase after the issuance of the 1982 and 1984
Guidelines, is broadly consistent with prior analysis and the theory of
"guideline institutionalization."92
[This increase in citation rate] is not merely the result of the
acceptance of superior ideas .

. .

. nor does the increase seem

consistent with a simple story of (possibly unwarranted) judicial
deference to agency promulgations ....

The guidelines themselves

became legitimized and valued beyond the content of their ideas.
The antitrust guidelines had acquired a power to influence the law
because they were the antitrust guidelines .... In short, the antitrust
guidelines had become a strong institution.93
The Treatise's lower citation rate in the first few years after its initial
publication in the late 1970s is unsurprising given that the Treatise was
relatively new and because judges may have relied on other authorities. With
regard to the Treatise, the citation rates remained relatively low until the
2000-2004 time interval. This 2000-2004 increase was fueled by citations

beginning in 2ooo and arguably reflects the courts' adopting particular
arguments from the Treatise, for example, the Treatise's "extraordinary" gain
approach to handling efficiencies,94 the revision of the merger sections of the
Treatise in a new edition of the Treatise that was published in 1998, and the
91. Data on file with author.
92. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse,48 WM. & MARYL. REV. 771, 8o6 (2006).
93. Id. at 812.
94. See infra Part VI.
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influence of Hovenkamp on that new edition.95 Over the years, the waxing
and waning of the direct references to the Treatise has also arguably reflected
judges' relative reliance upon the Merger Guidelines and the extent to which
Treatise positions became embodied in the prevailing legal precedent.
While a citation analysis has value, it is a very blunt instrument for
determining the nature of the influence and for examining more indirect
influences. To better understand the evolution of influence associated with
both the Treatise and the Merger Guidelines, we examine the treatment of
6
efficiencies in merger case law.9

VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER LAW AND
POLICY

We begin with the key case of FTC v. Procter & Gamble, which was
extensively litigated in the mid-196os.97 The FTC challenged Procter &
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox, such acquisitions were described as
conglomerate or product-extension mergers. The FTC Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") found the acquisition unlawful. The Commission ultimately
affirmed the ALJ, only to be reversed by the Sixth Circuit.s8 The Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and affirmed the FTC's order requiring
divestitures.99 The importance of the Court's ruling, for instant purposes,
stems from its fairly cursory statement that "[p] ossible economies cannot be
used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which
lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition.'100
The problems attendant to Justice Douglas's majority opinion did not
pass unnoticed. To the contrary, Justice Harlan's concurrence was highly
critical. He argued that this "increasingly important" area of conglomerate
mergers required much greater learning and experience than was being
accorded.' °' He observed that the majority did not confront "the problem of
efficiencies."--- Instead,Justice Harlan contended that, "[t] he Court attempts

95. Various supplements to the i98o edition, which was the first to cover mergers, were
published in intervening years. Hovenkamp participated in the writing of those supplements
beginning in 1987.

96. There is extensive literature that includes surveys examining the treatment of efficiencies
within merger decisions more generally. See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis:
An InstitutionalistView, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 189, 228-30 (2005); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H.
Lande, Efficiency Considerationsin MergerEnforcement,71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580,1593-99 (1983);Jamie
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Casefor ConsistentJudicialEfficiency Analysis,
6 3 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 17o8-23 (2010).

97.
98.
99.

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Id. at 5 70.
Id. at 5 81

lOO.

Id. at

lo.

Id. at 582 (Harlan,J., concurring).

102.

Id. at

5

8o.

5 9 7.
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to brush the question aside by asserting that Congress preferred competition
to economies."l°3 He challenged the majority's formulation of this
Congressional "preference" by transcending their unwarranted dichotomy
articulated by the majority-competition versus economies. He returned to
first principles and argued that antitrust seeks to protect competition and not
competitors.l0 4
Justice Harlan advocated that after a showing of a sufficient likelihood of
anticompetitive consequences, the analysis then should proceed to "examine
and weigh possible efficiencies . . . to determine whether, on balance,

competition has been substantially lessened."105 Justice Harlan's sole
elaboration upon this proposal was a single quotation of Donald Turner:
"Where detriments to competition are apt to be 'highly speculative' it seems
wisest to conclude that 'possibilities of adverse effects on competitive behavior
are worth worrying about only when the merger does not involve substantial
6
economies."o
The 1968 DOJ Merger Guidelines, written while Turner was Assistant
Attorney General ("AAG"), reflect an efficiency analysis generally consistent
with Turner's 1965 article.l°7 In 1969, District CourtJudge Marovitz granted
a preliminary injunction against the product-extension merger in United States
v. Wilson Sporting Goods.l°8 Despite noting that "[t]he defendant has not
offered any countervailing economies which might be weighed against the
adverse effects of the merger," Marovitz discussed and endorsed an
"economies defense."109 He expressly relied on both Justice Harlan's
concurrence and Turner's conglomerate merger article. He did not reference
the 1968 DOJ Merger Guidelines' efficiencies section. After this extremely
limited judicial treatment in the latter part of the 196os, virtually no judicial
rulings substantively addressed efficiency arguments in the merger context
until 1979 when the Ninth Circuit in RSR v. fTC resoundingly rejected an
°
efficiencies defense.'

103.

Id.

104.

See id.

105.
io6.

Id. at 5 98
Id.

107.
CompareMERGER GUIDELINES-- 1968, supranote 9o ,with Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965).

io8.
lo9.
11o.

United States v.Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 570 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
Id.
at 566.
RSR Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9 th Cir. 1979). Another

important case was United States v. General Dynamics Co., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). On the impact of

General Dynamics and the jurisprudence of the 1970s on merger efficiencies in the courts, see
William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 214 (2003). ("The narrow opening
to an efficiencies defense offered by GeneralDynamics was widened over the next five years by a
series of non-merger Supreme Court decisions.").
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Despite the prevailing and, particularly with regard to the Ninth Circuit,
continuing Supreme Court interpretation, an efficiencies defensewas included
in the 1982 DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines: in "extraordinary cases" the
Department would allow for merger-specific efficiencies proven with "clear
and convincing evidence" as "a mitigating factor for a merger that would
otherwise be challenged."'- The Guidelines acknowledged efficiencies
derived from "scale economies, integration of production facilities, or multiplant operations which are already enjoyed by one or more firms in the
The 1984 revised Guidelines removed the "extraordinary"
industry."'
language and efficiencies were treated as a factor rather than as a defense." 3
In addition, the list of possible efficiencies recognized was expanded to
include "general selling, administrative, and overhead expenses."' '4
William Kolasky and Andrew Dick characterize these efficiency-related
changes in the early to mid-198os as reflecting a transition between two
schools of thought within antitrust., 15More specifically, they cast it in terms
of a movement from the Chicago School which considered efficiencies
"unmanageable" and was, therefore, quite negative regarding their use, to a
Harvard School view, championed by Areeda and Turner," 6 which "argued
that rational antitrust policy required" its consideration and offered an
approach to do so."7 On this point, the 198o Treatise read:
In interpreting the Clorox language, moreover, observe that the
court referred only to "possible" economies and to economies that

I11.

MERGER GUIDELINES--I 982,

112.

Id. at 20,549-13 n.53.

supranote 9 o ,

13,102, at 20,549-13 & n.53.

o

113.
MERGER GUIDELINES-1984, supra note 9 , 13,103, at 20,564; see alsoAndrew I. Gavil,
Secondary Line PriceDiscrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J.
1057, 1 1 19-22 (1999) (insightfully analyzing the role of an efficiency defense in an effort to dispel
some of the "confusion" that has "plagued" antitrust regarding the "allotment of burdens of
production and burdens of proof").
114.

MERGER GUIDELINES-198

o

4

, supranote 9 , 13,103, at 20,564.

Kolasky&Dick, supranote io, at 222.
16. For an overview of the Harvard School on merger efficiencies, see DANIELJ. GIFFORD &
ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU
COMPETITION POLICY 41- 5 1 (2015).
115.

117.
Kolasky & Dick, supra note 1 1o, at 222. The Chicago School's antipathy to efficiencies
analysis in mergers is not that the School believes efficiencies do not exist, but likely reflects an
overall view that intervention should happen less often and a skepticism relating to thejudiciary's
abilities to assess these efficiencies. Robert Pitofsky wrote that the Chicago School "would infer
efficiency in a wide range of mergers" and "relax antitrust enforcement greatly to preserve
opportunities to achieve those efficiencies. But they dismiss any thought of requiring proof of
efficiencies on grounds that it is an issue that would be impossible to deal with in a court." Robert
Pitofsky, Proposalsfor Revised United States MergerEnforcement in a GlobalEconomy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195,
211 (1992). Hovenkamp has stated that the Treatise "is not a work of economics, and it has never
explicitly embraced any particular economic 'school.' . . . The Antitrust Law treatise is in fact
something of an economics scavenger, picking and choosing among economics' diverse theories
for doctrine that is both theoretically defensible and administratively useful." Hovenkamp,
Harvard,Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 13, at 618.
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"may" result from mergers that lessen competition. To reject an
economies defense based on mere possibilities does not mean that
one should reject such a defense based on more convincing proof.
In sum, the Clorox comment may be seen as a mere truism that
does not define what constitutes a "lessening of competition."" 8
What, for instant purposes, we refer to as the "Areeda-Turner approach" had
been recommended by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law in 1981 but was
subsequently rejected by then AAG William Baxter. While untangling the
forces that influenced this shift is difficult, there is some reason to believe that
the Treatise position on efficiencies could have been directly influential.
Kolasky and Dick argue that "borrowing from Areeda-Turner, [AAG Paul
McGrath] said the Division would look at efficiencies in determining whether
the merger was anticompetitive at all." 1 i9
The efficiencies defense occupied a more modest "recurring role" within
a number of federal court rulings throughout the 198os, following, in
particular, the DOJ's revised Merger Guidelines in 1984.',2o Most of these cases
heavily referenced the Guidelines, though not always when assessing
efficiency claims. Only two referenced the Treatise. With rare exception, as
discussed below, none of these cases expressly grapples with the propriety of
analyzing efficiencies nor, as a consequence, with the establishment of
standards or approaches that will permit consistency for analyzing
118. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
941 b, at 154 (198o).

119. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 1lo, at 220. Consistent with this view is the fact that the
discussion of the justification for the change in efficiencies treatment by McGrath in an interview
with the ABA uses similar arguments and language to the efficiencies section of the 1978 Areeda
and Turner Treatise. As an aside, McGrath, who was AAG in 1984, was a Harvard Law School
graduate and may have taken courses from either Turner or Areeda, both of whom were Harvard
Law School faculty.
12o.
During a 1985 ABA Antitrust Panel discussion, Turner noted that "[t]here is a lot of
dispute as to whether the efficiency defense should be recognized or not." Panel Discussion with
Richard C. Levin, Professor of Econ. & Mgmt., Yale Univ. &Janusz A. Ordover, Professor of Econ.,
N.Y. Univ., in 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 530 (1985). Turner noted that the 1982 Merger Guidelines
"were very tough on" such a defense and that the 1984 Merger Guidelines were "more
hospitable." Id. The FTC issued its own enforcement policy, Statement of the FTC Concerning
Horizontal Mergers, concurrently with the DOJ's release of its 1982 Merger Guidelines. See
generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT CONCERNING HORIZONTAL MERGERS (1982), reprinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,200 (June 15, 1993). The FTC's Merger Statement indicated
that the agency could properly account for efficiencies evidence through its prosecutorial
discretion at the pre-complaint stage, but "there are too many analytical ambiguities associated
with the issue of efficiencies to treat it as a legally cognizable defense." Id. at 20,904. The Treatise
itself, Timothy Muris, as well as Alan Fisher and Robert Lande are each cited twice within this
brief treatment in the Merger Statement. Id. See generally, Hillary Greene, Agency Characterand the
Characterof Agency Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional Perspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1O39,
1050-53 (2005) (comparing the FTC Merger Statement with the DOJ Merger Guidelines and
exploring the FTC's institutional features that contributed to the nature of its policy statement).
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efficiencies. , 2 Instead, the court's focus upon whether the efficiencies are of
a sufficient magnitude and, when they are, whether the efficiencies can be
obtained through other means.122
If one accepts the hypothesis that the Treatise influenced the 1984
Guidelines, then it would have, in turn, indirectly influenced the ig8os
district court cases. The question-admittedly unanswerable-then becomes,
in the absence of the Guidelines, what would have been the Treatise's
influence? In the wake of Clorox and RSR Corp., it is unclear that in the 198os
most of the district courts would have been as open to efficiencies arguments
if the Guidelines had not sought to legitimize them. One can argue that the
added authority of the Guideline institution was important as a channel of
influence for ideas developed elsewhere including in the Treatise.
It was not until 1988, in California v. American Stores Co., a case from the
Central District of California and, therefore, directly controlled by the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in RSR Corp. v. FTC, that a court squarely addressed the
foundational issue regarding the availability of the efficiency defense.25 The
district court held that the Supreme Court had "clearly rejected" an efficiency
defense.,"4 Although the court still saw fit to opine on this non-issue when it
expressed skepticism that if any efficiencies resulted, the court was "not
convinced" that the savings would be passed on to consumers."'5
This long-simmering, albeit only sporadically acknowledged, issue would
resurface a few years later in FTC v. University Health.' 6 The hastily issued
order delivered from the bench stated, "I am unconcerned by counsel's
challenge that this case may present elements of first impression if the Court
reviews and considers the efficiencies that might result from the transaction

For an example of such an exception, see Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
121.
F.2d 12o6 (1ith Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 68o (D. Minn.
122.
199o) (denying a preliminary injunction, noting: "The Court finds these efficiencies relevant,
not so much as an independent factorjustifying the proposed acquisition, but as further evidence
that the proposed acquisition will enhance competition," and referring to Guideline standards
for efficiencies (footnote omitted)); United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251,
1289 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (granting a preliminary injunction, and reasoning that the savings were
insufficient to "produce a significant economic benefit to consumers" using the Guidelines as a
standard); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 53 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying
a preliminary injunction, and reasoning that "defendants' contention as to realization of
economies [was] ... the more persuasive"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., Nos.
C8 4 -13o 4 , C8 4 -131 1, 1984 WL 355, at *22 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 1984) (granting a preliminary
injunction and noting that "efficiencies . . . [had been] greatly exaggerated and [were] largely
available through feasible alternative means other than merger").
State v. Am. Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
123.
124. Id.at1133.
125. Id.
126. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ. Health, Inc., No. CV1 9 1-o 5 2, 1991 WL 117432 (S.D. Ga.
Apr. 3, 1991).

2o62

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 100:2039

that is proposed."
The court then denied the FTC's motion for a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court and, more importantly for instant purposes, squarely addressed the role
of an efficiency defense within the merger context.zs The appellees argued
that the "significant efficiencies" flowing from the merger meant it "would not
substantially lessen competition."'29 The FTC's stark response was "that the
law recognizes no such efficiency defense in any form."13o The Eleventh
Circuit stated "that in certain circumstances, a defendant may rebut the
government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended
merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant market."'s' The
appellees, however, had not "introduce [d] sufficient evidence to demonstrate
17

that .

.

. any efficiencies [would result]."'s3

Owing to the weakness of the

appellees' efficiencies arguments, the court noted that it was "unnecessary...
to define the parameters of this defense now.",33
Central to the Eleventh Circuit's ruling was its treatment of Clorox. In
particular, the court noted that "[o] thers posit that the [Clorox] court merely
rejected the use of insufficient or speculative evidence to demonstrate
efficiencies; a limited efficiency defense to the government's prima facie case,
they argue, remains available."'34 For this proposition, the court quoted the
Treatise: "To reject an economies defense based on mere possibilities does
not mean that one should reject such a defense based on more convincing
proof' and it also referenced Professor TimothyJ. Muris's 1980 Case Western
Reserve Law Review article.'35 The court then concluded, albeit in dicta, "an
efficiency defense to the government's prima facie case in section 7
challenges is appropriate in certain circumstances."'3 6 Though the court did
not specifically quote it, the Treatise discussed that it employs the terminology

127.

Id. at *8. The court fused its analysis of the efficiencies with the acquired firm's

"deteriorat[ing]" status. Id.
128. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 12o6,
129. Id. at 1222.

1209 (1 ith

Cir. 1991).

130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.
133.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1222 n.3o. A discussion follows regarding the various difficulties associated with

assessing efficiencies and cites to a number of authorities including the Treatise-"advocating
partial defense limited to types of efficiencies"-and the Merger Guidelines-"claims about
expected efficiency gains are 'easier to allege than to prove.'" Id. at 1222-23 n.30, 1223. Areeda
and Turner are just one of a number of extremely thoughtful commentators the court identified
who have provided "suggestions" regarding "the proper scope of an efficiency defense." Id. at
1223 n.3o. Others discussed were: Robert Bork, Alan Fisher, Robert Lande, TimothyJ. Muris,
Paul Rogers, Lawrence Sullivan, and Oliver Williamson. Id.
134. Id. at 1222.
135.

Id. (citing Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30

CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381 (198o)). See supra note 133 for a more extensive treatment of the
Treatise position.
136.
Univ. Health, Inc., 958 F.2d at 1222.
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of efficiency "defense" to refer to "a defense to a prima facie case" or "to the
rebuttal of a first order inference" regarding anticompetitive effects in
violation of section 7.137
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit's standard in FTC v. University Health draws
expressly and heavily upon the Treatise. After this 1991 ruling, until the next
pivotal judicial decision in 2000, five of the ten merger rulings that address
efficiencies claims directly reference the "prima facie" language in FTC v.
University Health.'38 None of those five decisions, however, reference the
Treatise by name.
In retrospect, it appears that the Supreme Court's ostensible rejection of
an efficiencies defense may have dramatically chilled its invocation for over a
decade. In the early 198os, through their Guidelines and resulting litigation,
DOJ in particular enhanced the profile of the efficiency defense.'s9 The
judicial rulings regarding mergers at this time addressed efficiencies without
having meaningfully probed the more fundamental and underlying issue
regarding the propriety of their consideration. It would seem, then, that the
ability to fine tune the legal standards applicable to the efficiencies defense
would not likely occur until there was a more formal reckoning of their basic
legitimacy.
In the mid-199os, much of the discourse regarding the treatment of
efficiencies in the antitrust merger context occurred in the antitrust agencies.
An important contribution to this discourse was the FTC's 1996 Staff Report,
Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global
Marketplace.,4o Commenting six months after the report's release, FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky observed that the report had "accelerated and
focused debate on the treatment of efficiencies in merger enforcement."14'
Pitofsky noted that ajoint FTC-DOJ taskforce was meeting to address how to
"incorporat[e] efficiencies as a mitigating factor in merger enforcement."'42
With regard to the taskforce's greatest challenge-" [w] hich efficiencies and

AREEDA &TURNER, supranote 118, 941 b, at 153-54.
138. SeeFed. Trade Comm'n v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 61 (D.D.C. 1998);
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. io66, io88 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v.
Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (W.D. Mich. 1996); United States v. Mercy
Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
139.
SeeKolasky & Dick, supranote i to, at 222-23.
140.
1 FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN
THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/anticipating-21 st-century-competition-policy-new-high-tech-global-marketpla
ce/gc_v .pdf.
141. Robert Pitofsky, Former Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Report on
Competition Policy: Six Months After (Nov. 7, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/ 1996/1 i/ftc-staff-report-competition-policy-six-months-after.
142. Id.
137.
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how much do they matter?"-Pitofsky's starting pointwas clear.43 "In myview,
the Areeda-Turner Treatise (as is so often the case in antitrust analysis) offers
the most thoughtful guideline to evaluating different types of efficiency."'44
As such, the Treatise that appeared to have influenced both DOJ's Merger
Guidelines in the 198os, as well as their subsequent interpretation by the
courts, was poised yet again to influence guideline formulation and, not
surprisingly, their subsequent interpretation as well.
In 1997, the agencies revised the 1992 Merger Guidelines by expanding
the efficiencies section. The 1997 Merger Guidelines state that:
The agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are
of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to
be anticompetitive in any relevant market. To make the requisite
determination, the Agency considers whether [the] cognizable
efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's
potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by
preventing price increases in that market.45
This approach to prosecutorialdiscretion differed somewhat with that of the
Hovenkamp-revised second edition of the Treatise in 1998. While the Treatise
and the Guidelines both sought to consider efficiencies, the Treatise explicitly
questioned the ease with which a court assess post-merger price effects. More
specifically, the Treatise:
[W]ould not require any calculus comparing likely price increase
effects with likely efficiency effects and showing that resulting post
[-]merger prices [would] be no higher than premerger prices. In the
great majority of circumstances, certainly including all reasonably
close cases, the state of the science does not permit such refined
showings. 146
Instead the Treatise recommends that if a significant anticompetitive threat
exists, then it "would require a showing of 'extraordinary' gains tending to
show that postmerger output would be at least as high as premerger output,

143. Id. (emphasis omitted).
144. Id.; see also Robert Pitofsky, Proposalsfor Revised United States MergerEnforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 220-21 (1992) (providing a more nuanced assessment of the Treatise's
recommendations regarding efficiencies). Though beyond this Essay's scope, the treatment of
efficiencies within the merger context also implicates more fundamental questions regarding the
goals of antitrust. See, e.g., Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards,supra note 7, at 2538-41 (discussing
welfare tests and their application to merger efficiencies);John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande,
The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: ProtectingConsumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 191, 224-27 (2oo8) (endorsing the elevation of consumer welfare above economic
efficiency).
o ,
145.
MERGER GUIDELINES--1992, supranote 9
13,104, at 20,573-13.
146. 4 A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP &JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
971 f (rev. ed. 1998).
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and thus that postmerger prices would be no higher than premerger

prices."147
While this "extraordinary" gains language first appeared in the 1998
Treatise, the underlying arguments regarding a limited use of efficiencies
had, of course, long been a part of the broader antitrust discourse including
in prior Treatise installments. And it is just this phrasing that the court in
Heinz adopted and subsequent rulings frequently reiterated when addressing
merger efficiencies.
In 2000, the D.C. District Court denied the FTC's request for an
injunction against the Heinz/Beech-Nut merger.,48 Judge Robertson,
referencing PhiladelphiaNationalBank and the Merger Guidelines, held that
the FTC had established a prima facie case.,49 With regard to efficiencies,
Robertson noted the revised guidelines provided that "efficiencies are
properly considered in merger analysis"15o and then quoted the guidelines
regarding the types of efficiencies recognized.'5' Ultimately, the court
accepted the defendant's argument that the merger was necessary "to
challenge Gerber's dominant market share" because it would increase their
efficiencies which, in turn would enable them to compete.s5
The FTC sought and received an injunction pending an expedited
appeal ofJudge Robertson's ruling. The D.C. Circuit panel,Judges Ginsburg,
Tatel and Garland, issued a per curiam decision that characterized the
efficiency defense as "novel."'53 The court also noted a lack of precedent
because the "Supreme Court ha[d] not addressed [this issue] since the 196os
(and then, unfavorably)," the D.C. Circuit had itself "never addressed" the
issue, and "the antitrust enforcement agencies have only recently clarified
their views."'54 Though the court noted the value of "recognizing an
efficiencies defense in principle" its role in the instant case was complicated
owing to "the high concentration levels present."55 The court then quoted
the Treatise which supported an "efficiencies defense but [would] requir[e]
'extraordinary' efficiencies where the 'HHI [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index]
is well above 18oo and the HHI increase is well above 1oo."'5 6 After quoting
the Treatise, the court referenced the Guidelines statement "that
147.

Id.

148. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. HJ. Heinz, Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 201 (D.D.C. 2000). This
remains the only case since the 1997 Merger Guidelines to focus on efficiencies. Id. at 198-99.
149.
150.

Id. at 19 5 - 9 6.
Id. at 198 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF, supranote 140, at i) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
151.

Id. at 199.

152.

Id. at 198- 9 9 ,
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. HJ. Heinz, Co., No oo-5362, 200oWL 174132o, at *2 (D.C. Cir.

153.

Nov. 8, 2ooo) (per curiam).
154.

Id.

155.

Id.
Id. (quoting 4AAREEDA, HOVENKAMP &SOLOW, supranote 146,

156.

9 71f,

at 44).
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to monopoly or near-

monopoly.'"'57

Immediately after the D.C. Circuit's initial ruling in Heinz, the D.C.
District Court again addressed efficiencies in -FTCv. Swedish Match.,5 The
court relied heavily upon the Heinz ruling that it had issued just one month
earlier. In particular, it noted the lack of clarity regarding the legitimate use
of efficiencies to rebut the government's prima facie case. It also included
Heinz's quotation of the Treatise regarding the need for a showing of
"extraordinary" efficiencies, given a high and increased level of
concentration. The Merger Guidelines were included in a string cite. Next in
2001 came the D.C. Circuit's final ruling in Heinz requiring "proof of
extraordinary efficiencies" for "high market concentration levels."59 Since
that time, another 13 federal court rulings have substantively addressed
efficiency defenses within merger actions. Seven of those rulings explicitly
relied upon the Heinz standard of "extraordinary" efficiencies derived from
the Treatise as well as substantial reliance on the Merger Guidelines. Several
of the cases that did not reference this "extraordinary" language involved
circumstances in which this criterion was not particularly germane. 16o
Perhaps most telling for instant purposes is the recent district court
ruling in Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa,Inc. v. St. Luke's Health System,
Ltd. in 201416, and its circuit court appeal in

157.

2015.

62

For more than two

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MERGER GUIDELINES-1992, supra note 9o, 113,104,

at 20,573-13).

158.

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 171-72 (D.D.C. 2ooo).

159. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F. 3 d 7o8, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
i6o. One court denied the preliminary injunction noting that it was "convinced that there
[would] be efficiencies resulting from the merger," but then added that "the efficiencies of the
merger [had] not played a determinative role in [the] case." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Foster, No.
CIV 07-352 JBACT, 2007 WL 1793441, at *49, *57 (D.N.M. May 29, 2007). A second case
referenced the Merger Guidelines and Heinz for other reasons, but it found that efficiencies were
not meaningfully contested. In particular, the court found that the defense expert's statement that
he would not apply the Guidelines analysis and offer of a "guesstimate []"about efficiencies did
not satisfy the burden. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1,
48-49
(D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a third case, the court emphasized factual
analysis, and the sole reference to the Guidelines was one sentence at the end of the section
finding that an efficiency defense was not met. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d
io98, 1175 (2004). The other cases within this category are similarly varied. See generally
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 749 F. 3 d 559 (6th Cir. 2014), petitionforcert.
filed, No. 14-762 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2014); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13 -cv-ooi 3 3-WHO,
2014 WL 203966 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 8, 2014); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV
1o-1873 AG (MLGx), 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 201 1).
161. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 1:12-CVoo56o-BLW, 1:1 3 -CV-oo16-BLW, 2014 WL 4 o7 4 4 6, at *23-24 (D. IdahoJan. 24, 2014).
162. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd., No. 14-35173,
201 5 WL 5 2 5 5 4 0, *8-1 1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1o, 2015).

2015]

JUDICIAL TREA TMENT OF THE ANTITRUST TREATISE

2o67

decades, spanning from University Health.63 in 1991 to Heinz, 64 in 2000, the
courts have observed that the Supreme Court has yet to address the role of
efficiencies within the merger context and, in each instance, those
subordinate courts have continued their oftentimes substantial reliance upon
the Treatise to help guide them. In St. Luke's, the district court delineates the
absence of Supreme Court precedent, the presence of "trends" among the
lower courts regarding efficiencies, and incorporates a direct-albeit arguably
unnecessary--reference to the Treatise as well.',6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's preliminary injunction and its ruling addresses certain key
decision including Heinz and the most recent incarnation of the Merger
Guidelines, issued in 2010,166 which closely tracks the 1997 version with
regard to efficiencies.' 67 The Circuit Court decision was skeptical of any
efficiencies being able to overcome anticompetitive effects of a merger.
This narrow paper trail of judicial rulings in this matter, then, suggests
that the Treatise exerts an ongoing, though ostensibly more attenuated,
influence. But, the Treatise continues to quite literally shape the legal
discourse. During the Ninth Circuit's oral argument in St. Luke's, FTC counsel
Joel Marcus repeatedly invokes the Treatise in a manner similar to legal
precedent and the Guidelines.' 68
VII. CONCLUSION: INFLUENCING THE COMMON LAW

How does academic literature influence the common law? As a starting
point, one can consider jurisprudential development as a contest of ideas in
which relevant and well-reasoned arguments can, in theory, influence the
discourse. While this argument has merit, at least directionally, it is crucial to
consider how various ideas gain attention and hence influence and this
depends in turn on the demand for and the supply of ideas injudicial settings.
The demand for ideas depends, for example, on the degree to which the law
is changing, perhaps because of new legislation or regulatory rules, changes
in the supporting social science, changes in the types of fact patterns that
present cases of first impression, and the lack of judicial guidance or what is
perceived as questionable judicial guidance. Similarly, the supply of ideas
depends on factors including changes in social science and changes in
institutions that give credibility to some ideas

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 ( 1 th Cir. 1991).
164. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. HJ. Heinz, Co., No. 00-5362, 2000 WL 1741320 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
8,2000) (per curiam).
165. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 201 4 WL 4 07 4 4 6, at *23.
166. See supra note 9 o .
167. See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal MergerGuidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 55 (2010).
168. See generally Oral Argument, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke's Health
Sys., Ltd., No. 14-35173 ( 9 th Cir. Nov. 19, 2014), 201 4 WL 6853683.
163.
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In the context of U.S. antitrust merger law, many of these factors
increased the demand for ideas. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act essentially
shifted the focus of merger law to the federal antitrust agencies as well as
emphasizing prediction.,69 Economics, a key foundation for understanding
the effects of various types of market conduct, was rapidly evolving during the
197os. Those changes are both ongoing and wide-ranging; they encompass
both theoretical understandings and econometric tools. From the 198os
onward, there were substantial increases in globalization and increased
importance of information-based industries, while mergers became
increasingly strategic-as opposed to conglomerate-in nature. Given such
developments, it was inevitable that merger law, as with any area of law, would
lag at times. These gaps or shortcomings in guidance were further
exacerbated by, for example, the Supreme Court's unwillingness to accept
substantive merger cases.
On the supply side, the federal antitrust agencies began issuing public
statements of the agencies' merger prosecution policies. The resulting
Merger Guidelines became increasingly relied on and arguably eventually
became an "institution" in and of themselves.7 Futhermore, changes in
social science provided fertile soil for the growth of new ideas. Along these
lines, it is interesting to consider the role of an antitrust treatise in the law's
development. Both the Merger Guidelines and the Treatise were influential
in part because they provided one-stop authoritative guides for antitrust
analysis of mergers. The Guidelines were well-exercised and debated; the
Treatise was a more expansive and up-to-date source for a summary of the
state of the law, a discussion of relevant debate, and well-argued
recommendations for what the law should be. The Treatise is complementary
to the Merger Guidelines.
Individual legal analyses, of course, do this too. But, putting aside
questions about the novelty or superiority of the arguments, the Treatise has
major advantages in terms of potential influence. Particularly in earlier times,
access to and identification of the appropriate individual law review articles
was much more costly than it is now. A comprehensive treatise helped address
that problem. Furthermore, this Treatise, or shall we say The Treatise, has the
authority of top legal scholar authors and a long-standing, carefully cultivated
reputation for top quality. And, as we know, market power is permissible when
it derives from superior acumen.

169. The antitrust agencies also shaped the development of law by their decisions of which
cases to bring.
,
170. See Greene, supra note 92 at 834 ("Collectively, the statistics and case studies are
evidence that the merger guidelines exist as an institution with influence apart from their
congruence with the law.").

